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The Forgotten Residents:
Defining the Fourth Amendment "House"
to the Detriment of the Homeless
Lindsay J. Gust

The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter-all his force
dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement! 1

I. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MISTREATMENT OF THE HOMELESS
In March 2015, Los Angeles police officers shot and killed a
homeless man who went by the name of Africa when he attempted to
retreat into his tent. 2 Police officers had been called to investigate a
robbery on Skid Row. 3 When the police arrived, Africa, who had been
arguing with another man, went inside of his tent. Police forcibly pulled
Africa from his tent and used a stun gun on him, which resulted in an
altercation leading to his death.4 In August 2014, Los Angeles police
officers brutally beat a mentally ill homeless man named Samuel
Arrington after he refused to sign a citation for violating city codes.5

t B.A. 2013, Tulane University; J.D. Candidate 2017, The University of Chicago
Law School. I would like to thank Professor Aziz Huq for his invaluable guidance and for
encouraging me to rethink my arguments throughout the writing process.
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (quoting the 1763 speech of William Pitt,
earl of Chatham, in the House of Commons).
2

Sarah Kaplan, LAPD Officers Justified in Fatal Shooting of Homeless Black Man, Panel

Says, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/
02/03/lapd-officers-justified-in-fatal-shooting-of-homeless-black-man-panel-says/
[http: //perma.

cc/PN5L-YDN5]; Carimah Townes, Man Who Just Finished 10-Year Stint in Mental Health
Institution Shot Dead by Police, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 2, 2015), http:I/thinkprogress.org/
justice/2015/03/02/3628412/police-kill-homeless-man-on-skid-row/ [http://perma.cclXWZ4-L9TF].
3 Kaplan, supra note
2.
4

Id.
Renee Lewis, LAPD Beating of Homeless Man Prompts Call for Federal Probe, ALJAZEERA

(Apr. 24, 2015, 5:26 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/4/24/police-attack-homelessLA.html [http:/Iperma.cc/8LXK-F6NJ].
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That same year, police in Albuquerque, New Mexico, shot and killed a
homeless man named James Boyd when a disagreement broke out after
police approached him for camping illegally. 6 These and other incidents
of police violence against the homeless could arguably have been
avoided had the police officers respected the homeless individuals' right
to be left alone inside of their makeshift shelters. While data on police
brutality and the homeless is lacking, media coverage of these and
other particularly violent incidents has led to a discussion over whether
the police disproportionately target the homeless.7 Data suggests
homeless individuals make up a larger percentage of the country's
incarcerated population than they do the population at large.8
Within the past few years, police misconduct has been the subject
of intense public scrutiny.9 In addition to provoking a national debate
on issues of race and policing, the focus on police misconduct has
brought law enforcement's treatment of the homeless into the spotlight.
According to the National Coalition for the Homeless, in 2013 police
brutality accounted for six percent of nonlethal attacks on homeless
people. 10 Anti-homeless laws that prohibit lying down in public have
increased in cities by 119% since 2011,11 which may partially explain
the spike in violence against the homeless. 12 Over the past few years,
Nicole Flatow, The Five Most Egregious Police Brutality Incidents That Sparked a 10-Hour
Protest, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 31, 2014, 4:28 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/ustice/2014/03/31/
3420899/a-suicidal-vet-homeless-camper-and-other-police-brutality-victims-that-spurred-this-tenhour-protest/ [http://perma.cc/XP7B-HCST].
See Ned Resnikoff, Why the Homeless Might Be Especially Vulnerable to Police Violence,
ALJAZEERA (Mar. 2, 2015, 4:15 PM), http://america.aljazeera.comlarticles/2015/3/2/why-the[http://perma.cc/KE3F-NYSS]
homeless-might-be-especially-vulnerable-to-police-violence.html
(Eric Tars, senior attorney for the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, stated
there is evidence of "higher levels of violence against homeless people, including police violence,
but not limited to it.").
8 A 2008 study on incarceration and homelessness found that "homelessness is 7.5 to 11.3
times more prevalent among inmates than the general population." Nat'l Health Ctr. for the
Homeless Council, Incarceration & Homelessness: A Revolving Door of Risk, 2 IN FOCUS (Nov.
http: /www.nhchc.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/infocus-incarceration-nov2Ol3.pdf
2013),
[https://perma.cc/7582-QWE5].
9 See Eliott C. McLaughlin, We're Not Seeing More Police Shootings, Just More News
Coverage, CNN (Apr. 21, 2015, 7:26 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/20/us/police-brutality-videopolice
(arguing racially-motivated
[http://perma.cc/2FPT-QGM5]
social-media-attitudes/
misconduct is not a new phenomenon, but has only recently caught the public's attention with the
advent of video recording technology).
6

&

NAT'L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, VULNERABLE TO HATE: A SURVEY OF HATE CRIMES
1o
VIOLENCE COMMITTED AGAINST HOMELESS PEOPLE IN 2013 13 (2014), http:lnationalhomeless.org/

wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Hate-Crimes-2013-FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/BRM7-3B5K].
" NATL LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
CITIES 22 (2014), http://www.nlchp.org/documents/NoSafePlace
HOMELESSNESS IN U.S.

[http://perma.cc/GM6X-BCSV].
12

See NAT'L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 10, at 6 (In 1999 there were sixty-one

recorded attacks on homeless people. In 2013 there were 109. Attacks fluctuate over the years, but
"ha[ve] certainly not decreased in occurrence from 1999 to 2013." In addition, there were thirty
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there have been numerous reported instances of police using excessive,
and at times deadly, force against homeless individuals.
In addition to being especially vulnerable to police misconduct,
homeless individuals are more likely to be the victims of private
violence than are members of the general public. 13 Strikingly, over the
past fifteen years, nearly three times as many homeless individuals
were killed in bias-motivated attacks 14 than were individuals from all
other protected classes combined. 15 In 2013 alone, there were 109
reported acts of violence against homeless people, with eighteen
resulting in death. 16 Many more attacks went unreported.17
This Comment argues that examining law enforcement's treatment
of the homeless through the lens of the Fourth Amendment offers a
novel approach to reducing the incidence of police- and citizen-initiated
misconduct toward them. Specifically, prohibiting warrantless searches
of homeless individuals' temporary shelters could have an impact on
reducing misconduct toward them. Case law addressing searches of
homes and curtilage supports treating the temporary shelters of the
homeless as houses for Fourth Amendment purposes. The underlying
normative values of the Fourth Amendment further support a finding
that its protection of "houses" includes the makeshift shelters of the
homeless.
Recognizing that the Fourth Amendment protects the homeless
against warrantless searches of their shelters will reduce unnecessary
encounters-which often predate violent escalations-between the
homeless and law enforcement. If courts were to hold that homeless
individuals are entitled to Fourth Amendment protection inside of their
dwellings, a larger conversation about the way we police the homeless

percent more non-lethal attacks on the homeless in 2013 than in 2012.).
13

See id. at 22.

Various states' laws define bias-motivated or bias-related acts differently, and there is no
explicit federal definition for bias-motivated acts. See, e.g., Hate Crime Laws/Cases, CTR. FOR THE
STUDY OF HATE & EXTREMISM (July 20, 2015),
http://hatemonitor.csusb.edu/resources/
hate crime law.htm [https://perma.cc/99SV-TGQZ]. Report Hate defines a "bias-motivated act" as

"any incident in which an action taken by a person or group is perceived to be . . . discriminatory
(bias) toward another person or group based on such characteristics as race, color, socioeconomic

class, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation,
gender, or gender identity or any situation in which inter-group tensions exist based on such group

characteristics.... All hate crimes are considered hate and bias incidents, but not all bias
incidents are considered hate crimes." Univ. of California Santa Cruz, Definitions, REPORT HATE
(2015), http://reporthate.ucsc.edulabout/definitions.html [https://perma.cc/3KNQ-JUH8].
i5
From 1999-2012, there were 132 homicides classified as hate crimes (based on the victim's
race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity), and 375 homicides of homeless people as a result of
bias-motivated attacks. NAT'L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 10, at 7.
1

Id. at 6.

1

id.
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would follow. Changing police tactics should reduce the incidence of
private violence against the homeless as well. Dignity-centric law
enforcement policies and guidelines would require police approach
homeless communities with an eye toward protecting them, rather than
punishing them.
This Comment begins with an overview of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Part II focuses on what qualifies as an unlawful search,
and how the Court's analysis has changed over time. Part III presents
the first major prong of the argument: the temporary shelters of the
homeless are protected under the Fourth Amendment. This Part is
broken up into two general sub-sections, each devoted to discrediting
what I see as the major counter-arguments. First, it explains why
homeless individuals' temporary shelters are not abandoned property.
And second, it counters the argument that homeless individuals'
dwellings are not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection because the
homeless are trespassing on public or private property. Part IV
addresses the second prong of the argument. This Part argues that the
makeshift shelters of the homeless qualify as houses for Fourth
Amendment purposes, and therefore law enforcement must obtain a
warrant before conducting a search. Three arguments are presented to
support the conclusion that makeshift shelters qualify as houses for
constitutional purposes; they are: (1) makeshift shelters are places of
intimate association, (2) Fourth Amendment "houses" include
nontraditional houses, and (3) Fourth Amendment analyses consider
normative values like privacy and dignity. Lastly, Part V focuses on the
policy implications of providing more robust Fourth Amendment
protections to the homeless.
II. A BRIEF EVOLUTION OF SEARCHES UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against the
unreasonable search or seizure of their "persons, houses, papers, and
effects."" This Comment focuses on searches of houses, and the
meaning of "house" in the Fourth Amendment context. First, this Part
provides background information on the Fourth Amendment's adoption,
and second, it discusses the way in which Fourth Amendment doctrine
has evolved over time, with a focus on searches of houses.

'8

U.S. CONST. amend.

TV.
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The Fourth Amendment's Drafting and Protection of
the Home

When the Constitution was first adopted, there was no mention of
searches or seizures.19 The Bill of Rights, which includes the Fourth
Amendment, did not come into effect until about two years after the
Constitution's enactment.2 0 For years preceding the Constitution's
adoption, however, there had been resistance in both England and the
colonies to the Crown's use of general search warrants and writs of
assistance. 21 General warrants and writs of assistance were not
identical, but both allowed officers to conduct a search without
specifying the location of the search or the items or persons to be
seized. 22 In addition, writs of assistance permitted officers to search the
homes and property of individuals for an almost indefinite period of
time, regardless of whether they were suspected of any misconduct. 23
Although officials could use general warrants to search various
types of property, eighteenth-century colonists were primarily angered
by officials' use of general warrants and writs to physically search their
homes. 24 A number of controversies broke out during the eighteenth
century in which individuals challenged the Crown's use of general
warrants to search their houses. 25 In one of these cases, merchants
from Massachusetts hired attorney James Otis to contest the writs.
Otis appealed to the court, arguing that the writs allowed unjustifiable
intrusions into men's homes: "Now one of the most essential branches
of English liberty is the freedom of one's house. A man's house is his
castle; and whilst he is quiet, he is well guarded as a prince in his
castle." 26 Though Otis's clients were merchants whose ships and

" THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 58

(2d ed. 2014).
"'

See

Bill

of

Rights,

NAT'L

CONSTITUTION

educational-resources/historical-documents/bill-of-rights
(last visited Feb. 2, 2016).
21

CTR.,

http: /constitutioncenter.org/learn/

[http://perma.cc/38QP-BKUF]

See CLANCY, supra note 19.

Barry Jeffrey Stern, Warrants Without Probable Cause, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1385, 1389-91
n.16 (1994).
22

23

Id.

See David E. Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1063 (2004) (explaining that the Framers intended for the Fourth
Amendment to protect against unreasonable physical searches of one's home).
2
Id. at 1063-64 (discussing three major controversies of the time, each of which involved
physical searches of homes pursuant to general warrants).
26 Thomas K. Clancy, The Framer's Intent: John Adams,
His Era, and the Fourth
24

Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 1000 (2011).
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warehouses were also searched, Otis only challenged the searches of
their dwellings. 27
John Adams was in the courtroom when Otis spoke. Otis's speech
influenced Adams's drafting of the Massachusetts Constitution's search
and seizure provision. 28 At the time, many state constitutions already
incorporated a search and seizure provision banning general
warrants. 29 Adams's provision included the right of a person to be
secure in "his person, his house, his papers, and all his possessions."3 0
This provision later served as a model for the Fourth Amendment. 3 1
The final version included the language "persons, houses, papers, and
32
Although the
effects," as well as "and no warrants shall issue."

language differs, the versions are consistent in their recognition of one's
house as a place worthy of protection.
It is likely courts would not have considered the makeshift shelters
of the homeless to be "houses" at the time the Fourth Amendment was
enacted, or during the following century. Early Americans' dislike of
general search warrants was driven in part by classist concerns. 33 The
Framers were troubled that middle- and upper-class Americans had to
allow lowly officers to search their homes, and these concerns were
sometimes expressed to the courts. 34 Searches of poor homes, let alone
of a homeless person's cave or shack, would likely not have yielded the
same resentment. But, that is not the case today. Fourth Amendment
doctrine has evolved over the last century, and a number of courts have
held the Fourth Amendment protects the shelters of the homeless.
The Fourth Amendment's Analysis Over Time

B.

Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment was implicated only if a
recognizable property right had been violated. 35 For example, a
property right violation, like a trespass, was often a de facto Fourth
Amendment violation. Olmstead v. United States 36 held that the Fourth
Amendment protected against unreasonable searches "of material
1
See Steinberg, supra note 24, at 1066-67 (citing Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original
FourthAmendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 601-02 (1999)).
28 See CLANcY, supra note 19,
at 50.
29
Id. at 57.
30

Id.

"1

Id. at 57, 69.

32

Id. at 73.

'3 Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourthAmendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 57778 (1999).
`
Id. at 578.
35 See, e.g., CLANCY, supra note 19, at 8; Elizabeth Schutz, Note, The Fourth Amendment
Rights of the Homeless, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1007-08 (1992).
36 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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things-the person, the house, his papers or his effects." 37 In 1967, the
Supreme Court effectively overturned Olmstead in Katz v. United
States.38 In Katz, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment's
protection was not predicated on a property interest. 39 The Court's
holding made it possible for a search to be deemed unconstitutional if it
interfered with an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, even
if there was no physical property law violation.
In Katz, the government secretly recorded the phone conversation
the defendant was having inside of a public telephone booth. The Court
held that although the defendant did not have a property interest in
the telephone booth, he had a recognizable privacy interest in excluding
the government from listening to his conversation. 40 Justice Harlan
interpreted the Court's ruling as establishing a twofold requirement,
which has become the cornerstone of Fourth Amendment analysis
today. The Katz test requires: "[F]irst that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."' 41
Katz's reasonableness test is the most commonly used among
courts conducting Fourth Amendment analyses today. 42 While courts
often gloss over the first prong of the test, finding that a subjective
expectation of privacy is usually present, 43 they continue to struggle to
apply the test's second prong: whether an individual's expectation of
privacy is reasonable in the eyes of society. To put it in other words, the
question of "whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment"
continues to perplex courts. 44 These values include concepts like
privacy, dignity, and the freedom to be one's self away from the eyes of
the State.

* Id. at 464.
389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
* Id. ("[Tlhe reach of [the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion into any given enclosure.").
4

Id. at 353.

41

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See Note, The Fourth Amendment's Third Way, 120 HARv. L. REV. 1627, 1629 (2007); see
also Steinberg, supra note 24, at 1054.
42

4a

See Wesley C. Jackson, Note, Life on Streets and Trails: Fourth Amendment Rights for the

Homeless and the Homeward Bound, 66 VAND. L. REV. 933, 941 (2013) ("Courts since Katz have
emphasized the 'reasonable expectation of privacy' aspect of Justice Harlan's two-pronged test and
have overlooked the 'subjective' aspect."); see also State v. Pruss, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (Idaho 2008)
("[O]ne can certainly infer that a person has a subjective expectation of privacy in his dwelling,
even if it is a temporary structure like a tent, travel trailer, or the hooch in this case.").
44
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984).
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Lower courts and scholars alike have noted the ambiguity of the
Katz test. The test requires courts to interpret whether society would
view a particular privacy interest as reasonable; an inquiry that seems
"designed for sociologists, not judges." 45 Scholars have attempted to
categorize the various models the Supreme Court has employed in its
reasonableness analysis, but even then, there remain outliers that do
not fit into any recognizable pattern. 46 As Daniel Solove explains:
The reasonable expectation of privacy test isn't merely in need of
repair-it is doomed.

.

.. [T]he test purports to be an empirical

metric of societal views on privacy. The Supreme Court,
however, has never cited empirical evidence to support its
conclusions about what expectations of privacy society deems to
be reasonable. 47
Because of the test's ambiguity, it is difficult to reconcile some of the
48
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment opinions with one another.
Since Katz, the Supreme Court has clarified that the privacy-based
test did not repudiate the earlier property-based analysis. 49 Rather, the
Court explained in United States v. Jones5 0 that the Katz test "has been
added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test."5 1 In
Jones, the Court held the government's attachment of a GPS device to
the defendant's car to monitor his movements was a search under the
Fourth Amendment. 52 The Court explained that the government's
physical occupation of the defendant's property constituted a trespass,
which would have been prohibited under the Framers' understanding of
the Fourth Amendment. 53 "[F]or most of our history the Fourth
Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for
government trespass upon the areas ('persons, houses, papers, and
effects') it enumerates."5 4 A government trespass on one of these areas
The FourthAmendment's Third Way, supranote 42, at 1635.
See CLANCY, supra note 19, at 11 (categorizing the Court's reasonableness analysis as
falling under one of five models, but noting there are "several situations that do not easily fit
within any of those models").
"

46

4

DANIEL SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE 117 (2011).

For example, compare California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding aerial
surveillance of defendant's backyard did not violate defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy),
with Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding use of thermal imaging device to detect
temperature inside defendant's home violated defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy).
See, e.g., CLANCY, supra note 19, at 9 ("[T]he Court now recognizes that the Amendment
4
protects certain property interests as such, as well as possessory and liberty interests.").
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Id. at 952.
52
Id. at 950-51.
Id. at 949.
Id. at 950.
4
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implicates the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether courts would
find the property owner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
invaded space. In Jones, even though the defendant did not have a
privacy interest in the space under his car, he had a property interest
(by virtue of owning the car-an "effect") that the Fourth Amendment
protects.
In regard to searches related to one's home, property-based
protections often overlap with privacy-based protections.5 5 Warrantless
searches of the home or its curtilage 56 have been found unconstitutional
both because they occur in a constitutionally protected area (houses),
and because they violate the resident's reasonable expectation of
privacy. Both rationales can also be used to explain why a law
enforcement officer's warrantless entry into a homeless person's
makeshift shelter is an unconstitutional search. When an officer enters
a makeshift shelter without a warrant, he violates the homeless
person's expectation of privacy and enters a constitutionally protected
area-her home. Courts could hold these entries unconstitutional
either by conducting a Katz analysis and finding the homeless person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the space, or by finding the
space qualifies as her home, and the right to exclude law enforcement
from entering without a warrant is to be presumed.
III. INTERPRETING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO PROTECT THE
MAKESHIFT SHELTERS OF THE HOMELESS

This Part will address the threshold question of whether tne
Fourth Amendment is implicated by a search of a homeless person's
makeshift shelter. Just because the Fourth Amendment applies does
not mean a search warrant is necessarily required before officers enter.
Part IV explains why the search of a makeshift shelter should also
trigger the warrant requirement. In doing so, it explains the
characteristics of a makeshift that render it a house for constitutional
purposes. But for now, it will suffice to understand "makeshift shelter"
as the enclosed or semi-enclosed place in which a homeless person
resides.

" See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("And so the
sentiment 'my home is my own,' while originating in property law, now also denotes a common

understanding-extending even beyond that law's formal protections-about an especially private
sphere.").
* Curtilage is defined as the space "harbor[ing] those intimate activities associated with
domestic life and the privacies of the home." United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 n.4 (1987).
The Fourth Amendment treats curtilage essentially the same as a dwelling. United States v.
Romero-Bustamente, 337 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2003).
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The two major arguments against recognizing the Fourth
Amendment's application involve abandonment and trespass. It can be
argued that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated because the
shelters of the homeless are abandoned property, which is not covered
by the Fourth Amendment. In addition, it can also be argued the
Fourth Amendment does not apply because the homeless are
trespassing on public or private property when occupying their
makeshift shelters. This Part will refute both of those premises, and
thus demonstrate why the Fourth Amendment protects the shelters of
the homeless.
A.

The Makeshift Shelters of the Homeless Are Not
Abandoned Property

The first potential barrier to finding the Fourth Amendment's
protection extends to homeless individuals' makeshift shelters is the
doctrine of abandonment. This issue arises only if the person has
temporarily left his or her shelter. Homeless people are required, like
the rest of society, to leave their dwellings in order to find work, and to
purchase food and other necessities. In addition, they must leave to
fulfill other basic needs like showering or using a restroom. Aside from
a few exceptional circumstances, it is well established that once
abandoned, property is no longer entitled to protection under the
Fourth Amendment.57 Courts have reached this conclusion in one of
two ways. Some courts find that an individual lacks standing to sue
once she abandons her property, and others hold that while she retains
standing, she is no longer entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.5 8
Because a homeless person's temporary shelter, however, does not
qualify as abandoned property in the context of the Fourth
Amendment, the doctrine does not serve as a barrier to recognizing the
Fourth Amendment applies.
The test for abandonment in the Fourth Amendment context is
distinct from the test used in the property law context.59 In the
57 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 49 n.2 (1988) ("[T]he act of placing garbage
for collection is an act of abandonment which terminates any [F]ourth [A]mendment protection[.]"
(citing United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 100-01 (5th Cir. 1979))).
8 See Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Search and Seizure: What ConstitutesAbandonment
of Real Property Within Rule That Search and Seizure of Abandoned Property Is Not
Unreasonable,99 A.L.R. 397 (6th ed. 2015).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also State v.
Wyatt, No. 71111-3-1, 2015 WL 1816052, at *8 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) ("The issue is not
abandonment in the strict property right sense but, rather, whether the defendant in leaving the
property has relinquished his or her reasonable expectation of privacy so that the search and
seizure is valid."); John P. Ludington, Annotation, Search and Seizure: What Constitutes
Abandonment of Real Property Within Rule That Search and Seizure of Abandoned Property Is Not
Unreasonable-ModernCases, 40 A.L.R. 381, § 2[a] (4th ed. 1985).
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property law context, property may be abandoned if an individual
voluntarily relinquishes legal title to it or her possessory interest in it.60
Federal appeals courts have rejected this approach in regard to the
Fourth Amendment, "decreeing that 'arcane concepts of property law do
not control an individual's ability to claim Fourth Amendment
protection."' 6 1 Instead, the inquiry is whether "the defendant
voluntarily discarded . . . his interest in the property in question so that
he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with
regard to it at the time of the search." 62 As the Tenth Circuit explained
in United States v. Jones,63 whether a person relinquishes his
expectation of privacy "is a question of intent, which 'may be inferred
from words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts."' 6 4 The test is
similar to the Katz inquiry, in that it emphasizes the reasonableness of
the individual's expectation of privacy, rather than property-law
concepts. 6 5
When homeless people leave their shelters to perform basic life
functions, or to simply engage in activities that are conducted outside of
the home, they have not abandoned their property. Unless a homeless
person verbally denies ownership of her shelter, or takes some similar
action indicating intent to relinquish her privacy interest in the place,
she has not abandoned it. Just as no one would suggest that an
individual relinquishes her privacy interest in her home when she
leaves for a week's vacation, it is implausible to suggest a homeless
person abandons her shelter when she temporarily leaves.
The defendant's actions in Jones exemplify an objective intent to
abandon one's property. There, the Tenth Circuit held the defendant's
satchel was abandoned for Fourth Amendment purposes because he
repeatedly claimed to have no knowledge of it, and later told police it

"' Ludington, supra note 59, at § 2[a]; see also United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 666
(6th Cir. 1986) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 123 (1978)). Property law treats chattel and
real property differently. Real property cannot be abandoned but can be acquired through adverse
possession.
6
Hosea v. Langley, No. Civ.A. 04-0605-WS-C, 2006 WL 314454, at *23 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 8,
2006) (quoting United States v. Ramos, 12 F.3d 1019, 1023 (11th Cir. 1994)), aff'd, 226 F. App'x.
863 (11th Cir. 2007).
62 Id. at *24 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 644 F.2d 1,
2 (5th Cir. 1981)).
63 707 F.2d 1169 (10th Cir.
1983).

Id. at 1172 (quoting United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199, 202 (9th Cir. 1981)).
" State abandonment law would likewise not serve as a barrier to recognition, as federal
courts have rejected using state property law to determine whether property has been abandoned
for Fourth Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Hosea, 2006 WL 314454, at *23 (citing United States v.
Fulani, 368 F.3d 351, 354 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Ramos, 12 F.3d 1019, 1023 (11th Cir.
1994); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Edwards, 441
F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1971)).
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was in a location that it was not. 66 When viewed objectively, therefore,
the defendant's actions and speech did not demonstrate intent to retain
a privacy interest in the satchel.
On the other hand, Pottinger v. City of Miami67 is an example of a
case in which the court found homeless individuals had not abandoned
their chattel property. The District Court for the Southern District of
Florida held officers' search and seizure of the defendants' property,
including bedrolls, bags, and boxes, violated their Fourth Amendment
rights.6 8 The court dismissed the city's argument that the property had
been abandoned. 69 Instead, the court explained the belongings of
homeless people are readily discernable from abandoned property:
Typical possessions of homeless individuals include bedrolls,
blankets, clothing, toiletry items, food and identification, and
are usually contained in a plastic bag, cardboard box, suitcase or
some other type of container. In addition, homeless individuals
often arrange their property in a manner that suggests
ownership, for example, by placing their belongings against a
tree or other object or by covering them with a pillow or
blanket.70
Similarly, in State v. Wyatt,7 1 the Court of Appeals of Washington
held officers' search of the defendant's closed containers, which he left
outside of his tent on public land, was impermissible under the Fourth
Amendment. 72 The court dismissed the State's claim that the property
was abandoned. 73 Rather, the court held that nothing in the record
indicated the defendant intended to relinquish his privacy interest in
the items, despite the fact that he may have been illegally occupying
public land. 7 4

A similar case is State v. Mooney.75 In Mooney, the Connecticut
Supreme Court's abandonment analysis was not based on "where legal
title rests" but "rather .

.

. whether the person claiming the protection

of the Fourth Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the

Jones, 707 F.2d at 1172-73.

6 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
6
61
70

n
7
7
71

7

Id. at 1570-73.
Id. at 1571.
Id.
No. 71111-3-1, 2015 WL 1816052 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at *5-8.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *8.
588 A.2d 145, 160 (Conn. 1991).
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invaded place."76 The defendant was a homeless man sleeping under a

bridge abutment.7 7 While he was away from the bridge, he stored his
belongings in a cardboard box and duffle bag, and took measures to
conceal them.78 The court found the defendant demonstrated no intent
to temporarily relinquish his privacy interest in the items, and
therefore they were not abandoned.79 The Mooney court distinguished
its ruling from that of the Supreme Court in California v. Greenwood. 0
In Greenwood, the Supreme Court held the defendant had abandoned
his trash when he left it on the curb.8 1 The Mooney court explained in
the present case, unlike in Greenwood, "no such purpose to leave [the
property] for collection by third party or to discard in any sense"
existed. 82
Mooney, Pottinger, and Wyatt primarily focused on the defendants'
personal possessions, rather than dwellings. There is not much case
law involving a search of a homeless defendant's empty makeshift
shelter. One such case is United States v. Ruckman.8 3 In Ruckman, the
defendant made his home inside of a cave on public land. 84 The Tenth
Circuit held officers' search of the cave constitutional because the
defendant was trespassing on public land.8 5 But even so, the court did
not justify its ruling by finding the defendant had abandoned his
shelter. Abandonment was not even mentioned.
The same rationale courts have used to find that homeless
individuals do not abandon their personal belongings when they
temporarily step away from them should be applied to the individuals'
makeshift shelters, but with even more force. If it is readily apparent to
the courts that a person has not relinquished her privacy interest in
bedrolls and blankets by virtue of the way they are arranged and
stored, it should be even more apparent that she has not relinquished
her privacy interest in a structure resembling her house. Furthermore,
tents, tarp-covered structures, and other containers that the homeless
live in are often positioned next to like structures, further obviating
their function as homes. In addition, these makeshift shelters are likely
7

Id. at 158 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 666 (6th Cir.

1986)).

8

Id. at 149.
Id. at 159-61.
Id. at 159-60.
486 U.S. 35 (1988).

"

Id. at 51.

82

Mooney, 588 A.2d at 160.
806 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1472.
For a detailed discussion on why the court's ruling is incorrect, see infra Part 1II.B.1.

17
7
7

'
8
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surrounded by possessions, like bedrolls and clothing, which society has
already recognized as un-abandoned.8 6
B.

The Trespass Doctrine Does Not Eliminate the Fourth Amendment
Rights of the Homeless

Having established that the shelters of the homeless are not
abandoned property, I will now address the second major counterargument. This section will repudiate the argument that the homeless
have no Fourth Amendment protection in their temporary shelters if
they are trespassing on public or private land. The Model Penal Code
defines criminal trespass as entering or remaining in a building or
occupied structure without a license or privilege to do so, or when there
is notice against trespass.87 Interestingly, one of the Model Penal
Code's defenses to prosecution for criminal trespass is that the building
was abandoned.8 8 Conduct similar to that proscribed in the Model
Penal Code is also likely to qualify as a trespass pursuant to any given
state's law. 89

This Part is broken up into two sub-sections. It will distinguish
between trespasses on private versus public property. Neither
trespassing on public nor private property should impede the Fourth
Amendment's recognition that homeless individuals have a privacy
interest in their dwellings. There may, however, be different concerns
in regard to each type of trespass.
1. Trespassing on public property does not bar the homeless from
the Fourth Amendment's protection.
Trespassing on public property should not disqualify an individual
from protection under the Fourth Amendment. While numerous lower
courts have held trespassing on public property eliminates the
homeless population's ability to contest searches of their dwellings, 90
8
See, e.g., Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1032 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding
homeless defendants' personal possessions left on public property were not abandoned), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2855 (2013); Mooney, 588 A.2d 145 (holding the same).
" See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2.
8 See id. at (3)(a).
" See, e.g., Byron Kahr, Article, The Right to Exclude Meets the Right to Ride: Private
Property, Public Recreation, and the Rise of Off-Road Vehicles, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 83-84
(2009) (Many state trespass laws closely track the Model Penal Code's language.).
9 See, e.g., Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1975) (finding police did
not violate privacy of homeless individuals when they "pok[ed] through the homes of some of the
plaintiffs without a search warrant or judicial authorization of any kind," because plaintiffs had no
legal property interest in the land); State v. Tegland, 344 P.3d 63, 64 (Or. Ct. App. 2015) (finding
police did not violate homeless man's privacy rights by lifting the tarp of his makeshift shelter);
People v. Thomas, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1331, 1333 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (finding police did not violate
homeless man's Fourth Amendment rights when they searched the box he was living in on a
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illegally residing on public land does not ipso facto strip an individual
of her Fourth Amendment rights. 9 1 While at one point property law
dominated the Fourth Amendment analysis, today, a person's
expectation of privacy can trigger the Amendment's protection even
without a claim to the property.
Lower courts have similarly held violations of state or local laws do
not "vitiate the Fourth Amendment's protection of one's property. Were
it otherwise, the government could seize and destroy any illegally
parked car or unlawfully unattended dog without implicating the
Fourth Amendment." 92 Such a principle would similarly strip any
camper who overstayed his camping permit of his Fourth Amendment
rights. 93
This concept is not novel. To give just one example, a similar
approach has thus far been taken in regard to the media's publication
of confidential information. The Court has held publication of publicly
valuable classified information cannot be enjoined-the journalists'
First Amendment rights remain intact-but has left open the
possibility that the journalists could be criminally prosecuted. 94
Likewise, a homeless individual living on public or private property can
be prosecuted for trespass,9 5 but her trespass should not negatively
implicate her Fourth Amendment rights. 96

public sidewalk; he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his shelter because he was illegally
occupying public property).
s See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("[W]hat [the defendant] seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected[.]").

Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2012).
See United States v. Sandoval, 200 F.3d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 2000).
9 The media has never been prosecuted for publishing confidential information. In New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971), the Supreme Court held the newspaper's
publication of classified information (known as the Pentagon Papers) could not be enjoined.
However, Justice White stated in concurrence that the newspaper could be subject to criminal
prosecution for publishing the information. Id. at 734; see also Alison Frankel, Journalistsand the
Espionage Act: Prosecution Risk Is Remote but Real, REUTERS (June 24, 2013),
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/06/24/journalists-and-the-espionage-act-prosecutionrisk-is-remote-but-real/ [https://perma.cc/C4H7-CSPA].
9
But cf. U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, SEARCHING OUT SOLUTIONS:
92
93

CONSTRUCTIVE

ALTERNATIVES

TO

THE

CRIMINALIZATION

OF

HOMELESSNESS

(2012),

https://www.usich.gov/resources/uploads/assetlibrary/RPT SoSMarch2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/
DXY4-57CR] (advocating for new policies in regard to the homeless, including barring law
enforcement officers from having the power to forcefully remove homeless people from public
land).
* While the homeless can be prosecuted for trespassing, courts have held the immediate
seizure and destruction of their property violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. See,

e.g., Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012); Kincaid v. City of Fresno, No. CVF-06-1445 OWW, 2008 WL 2038390 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Therefore, police officers could not search an
individual's shelter under the guise of an immediate seizure. In the least, notice would be
required.
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Judge McKay's dissenting opinion in Ruckman perfectly explains
why an individual's trespass on public property should not limit his
rights under the Fourth Amendment.9 7 In Ruckman, the defendant
made his home inside of a cave on public land. 98 He furnished the cave
with items like a bed, a stove, and a lantern, and built a wall and a
door. 99 Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit held the defendant was not
protected against a warrantless search of the cave, because he was
trespassing on public property. 100 The court held the defendant's cave
was not equivalent to his house, and therefore he had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in it.
The dissent's argument is more persuasive. Judge McKay first
takes issue with the majority's one-sided analysis of whether the cave
was the defendant's house: "[A]1though phrasing the issue as whether
the cave constitutes a 'house,' much of the court's reasoning
immediately following fails to analyze the characteristics of a house,
but rather focuses on the fact that Mr. Ruckman was a 'trespasser' on
federal lands[.]"10 1 Judge McKay suggests that the cave likely qualified
as the defendant's house. 102 And even if the cave was not the
defendant's house, the search was unreasonable because it violated the
defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy. 103 Judge McKay explains
that the Fourth Amendment has evolved in such a way that today,
"[s]earches and seizures may be 'unreasonable' within the Fourth
Amendment even though the [g]overnment asserts a superior property
interest at common law." 1 04 The defendant took all reasonable
measures to conceal the cave and treated it like his home, and therefore
surely had a recognizable privacy interest in his temporary dwelling.
Judge McKay's analysis recognizes two rationales courts can use to
find that a search of a homeless person's makeshift shelter implicates
the Fourth Amendment. First, courts can acknowledge that homeless
individuals' dwellings are houses, and are due the same level of
protection as traditional houses. Or second, courts can reach the same
conclusion using a privacy-based rationale-essentially, these spaces
97 See United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1478 (10th Cir. 1986) (McKay, J.,
dissenting) ("The fact that Mr. Ruckman may have violated a federal law by living in this cave (a
fact not established by this record) simply does not strip him of all his constitutional rights[.]").
` Id. at 1472.
" Id. at 1475.
'" Id. at 1473.
1'0
Id. at 1475.
102 Id. at 1478 ("The cave was his sole living quarters in every sense, furnished with a bed and
other crude furniture.").

Id.
10
protection
procedural
'0 Id.

at 1477 ("We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the
of privacy rather than property, and have increasingly discarded fictional and
barriers rested on property concepts.").
(citation omitted) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)).
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are protected because they are the site of the residents' intimate
association and private conduct.1 05 Because the homeless have literally
nowhere else to conduct these intimate activities, their expectation that
they may do so inside of their dwellings is reasonable. 106 If the resident
has taken all practical measures to keep outsiders out, like the
defendant in Ruckman, his expectation of privacy should be one society
is willing to recognize as reasonable.
This reasoning can be used to explain why those courts that have
held a homeless individual does not have a recognizable Fourth
Amendment interest in his temporary shelter are incorrect. One
example of such a case is Mooney. While the court held the defendant
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal belongings, it
neglected to find he had a similar interest in the larger space he was
living in.107 The defendant was residing under a bridge on public
land. 108 He reported that he thought of the space as his home, and
treated it as such. 109 For example, he had built shelves under the
bridge, and laid his personal belongings there and in the surrounding
area.110
The Mooney court's conclusion that the defendant did not have a
recognizable Fourth Amendment interest in the space under the bridge
is incorrect. As explained above, the defendant took reasonable
measures to make the space look like his house, and treated it as such.
Recognizing the defendant had a Fourth Amendment interest in this
general space is not as slippery a slope as it may seem. It would not
invite just anyone to claim a swath of land as his home, and assert a
Fourth Amendment interest in the space. The protection applies only to
the homeless, who truly reside in the space and treat it as their home.
There are also specific characteristics, explained in Part IV, that can
help officers and courts identify makeshift shelters that are being used
as homes. By definition, a non-homeless individual has a home that is
not a spot under a public bridge or a place beneath a tree. For this
person, the rights and expectations associated with the home do not
attach to these public spaces. It is therefore not dangerous to recognize
the defendant in Mooney had a Fourth Amendment interest in the
space under the bridge. Surely society agrees that there is a distinction
between these scenarios, and recognizes the need for protection in one

l'

06
'o

"
'o

no

This argument is expounded upon in Part IV.B.1.
See infra Part IV.B.1.c.
See State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 152 (Conn. 1991).
Id. at 149.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 150.
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rather than the other. The Katz framework considers societal norms in
determining when an expectation of privacy is reasonable, and
considering those norms here corresponds with the Court's existing
method of analysis.
2. Trespassing on private property does not bar the homeless from
the Fourth Amendment's protection.
The Fourth Amendment should likewise apply to searches of
homeless individuals' makeshift shelters located on private property. At
first blush, extending protection to those trespassing on private
property may seem more problematic. There are legitimate health and
safety concerns associated with trespass in abandoned buildings that
might be less present in the context of public land.
There are three responses to this concern. First, as with trespass
on public land, the Fourth Amendment is not the appropriate
mechanism to punish an individual for trespassing on private land. The
revocation of one's Fourth Amendment rights should not be used as a
deterrent to keep individuals from trespassing on private property. The
Founders intended for the Fourth Amendment to be a guarantee of
protection to the people, and a limit on the government's ability to
search and seize. Denying an individual her Fourth Amendment rights
as punishment for violating a local or state law is completely adverse to
the Amendment's purpose. Fourth Amendment protections are not
absolute, but the Court has never explicitly held that failure to comply
with unrelated statutory laws warrants its limitation.
It could be argued the fleeing felon doctrine provides that when
individuals break the law, the Fourth Amendment's protection is
suspended-officers are not required to obtain a warrant before
entering a building in hot pursuit of a suspect. But, in the case of the
fleeing felon, officers may violate the person's constitutional rights if
necessary to apprehend her, not because she has broken a law. The
revocation of her constitutional rights is not punitive, but necessary,
which is why the Court has been hesitant to allow such exceptions. A
warrant is still required if the individual is suspected of committing
only a minor offense.11 1
No such necessity exists in the case of a homeless person who is
peacefully residing on public or private land. And therefore, limiting
her Fourth Amendment rights in response to her trespass is punitive
and at odds with the Amendment's purpose. "Exceptions to the warrant

'n See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750-52 (1984) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 616-17 (1980)).
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requirement are 'few in number and carefully delineated."'11 2 Violating
a local or state law is not a delineated exception. In fact, the Supreme
Court has held on numerous occasions that a defendant does not waive
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches of
his home just because he is suspected of committing a crime. 113
Second, the doctrine of adverse possession provides that at some
point, squatters can acquire legal property rights in the place they are
residing. If the law is willing to recognize that squatters can acquire
permanent property rights in abandoned buildings, surely they can
acquire a less burdensome, temporary privacy interest in the space.
Third, there are alternative ways in which the State's interest in
maintaining the safety and structural integrity of abandoned buildings
can be satisfied. Health and safety inspectors are permitted to enter
private property to conduct inspections, but only after obtaining a
warrant based on probable cause. 114 And, "[w]here considerations of
health and safety are involved, the facts that would justify an inference
of 'probable cause' to make an inspection are clearly different from
those that would justify such an inference where a criminal
investigation has been undertaken."1 1 5 The probable cause standard in
regard to an administrative search is arguably less demanding than
that needed to justify a criminal investigative search. For example, in
1 16
Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco,
the
Supreme Court found that factors like "the passage of time, the nature
of the building . .. or the condition of the entire area" might be enough
to establish probable cause for an administrative inspection.1 1 7 This
procedure would be available to inspectors seeking to conduct searches
of abandoned buildings.
The State's public health and safety concerns do not justify
revoking the Fourth Amendment rights of homeless people who are
residing on private property. The appropriate, way to address these
concerns is through administrative inspections conducted pursuant to a
search warrant. Additionally, revoking the Fourth Amendment rights
of the homeless as punishment for trespassing is adverse to the
Amendment's underlying values and purpose. In sum, there is no
Id. at 749 (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (holding search of murder suspect's
apartment and scene of the crime unreasonable without a warrant); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969) (holding search of arrestee's house that expanded beyond the immediate area of the
arrest unreasonable without a warrant).
114
Camara v. Municipal Court of City and Cty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
1

11
16
117

Id. at 538.
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Id. at 538.
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strong justification for distinguishing between searches of a homeless
person's makeshift shelter located on private versus public land. Both
searches implicate the Fourth Amendment.
IV. A WARRANT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO SEARCH THE MAKESHIFT
SHELTERS OF THE HOMELESS

This Part focuses on the second major prong of the argument:
police officers must obtain a warrant before entering the makeshift
shelters of the homeless. Having established that the search of a
shelter implicates the Fourth
person's makeshift
homeless
Amendment, the next question is how much protection the Amendment
should provide that person. Just because a homeless person's makeshift
shelter is protected by the Fourth Amendment does not mean a search
warrant is required. A person has a privacy interest in her car, for
11 8
example, but a search warrant is not always needed to search a car.
This Part will address why a homeless person's makeshift shelter is
more like her house than her car or other chattel property, and thus
why a warrant is required.11 9
Prior scholarship argues the Katz test, which considers the
reasonableness of an individual's privacy expectations, should be
120
This
reworked to protect the makeshift shelters of the homeless.
Comment argues such revision is unnecessary. While the Katz test can
be used to find the shelters of the homeless should be treated like
traditional houses, 12 1 "Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with
the Katz formulation." 12 2 Instead, makeshift shelters that resemble
traditional houses or curtilage should already be protected under the
existing regime. A warrant is required because these shelters are
"constitutionally protected areas," 1 23 regardless of whether the Katz
test is employed.

"" See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985) ("[P]rivacy interests in an
the ready mobility of the automobile
automobile are constitutionally protected; however ...
justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests." (citation omitted)).
n9 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (Searches of houses traditionally
require a warrant before entering.).

See, e.g.,

Gregory Townsend, Article, Cardboard Castles: The Fourth Amendment's
Protection of the Homeless's Makeshift Shelters in Public Areas, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 223 (1999);
Michael D. Granston, Note, From Private Places to Private Activities: Toward a New Fourth
Amendment House for the Shelterless, 101 YALE L.J. 1305 (1992).
121
See infra Part IV.B (arguing homeless individuals' expectation of privacy in their dwellings
is reasonable); see also Granston, supra note 120, at 1326 (arguing the Court could use a private
activities standard, rather than a public exposure standard within the existing Katz framework in
cases involving the makeshift shelters of the homeless).
1
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
123 See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
120
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This Part presents three arguments in support of including the
shelters of the homeless in the constitutionally protected area of the
home. To begin, this Part will present a more thorough discussion of
the heightened level of protection houses receive under the Fourth
Amendment. Next, it will present three arguments as to why the
makeshift shelters of the homeless are also due a heightened level of
protection. These are: (1) houses are places where the resident's
expectation of privacy is high and where intimate activities occur, (2)
houses have been interpreted to include nontraditional houses, and (3)
the Amendment's normative values of dignity and privacy support
including makeshift shelters in Fourth Amendment "houses." 12 4 This
final argument also includes a discussion of cases that have treated the
shelters of the homeless as houses for Fourth Amendment search
purposes.
A.

The History of the Fourth Amendment's Core Protection of Houses

Since the Fourth Amendment's adoption, courts have framed its
preeminent attribute as protecting the right of an individual to be free
from an unlawful search or seizure in his or her home. 125 From Otis's
speech to eighteenth century Americans' overwhelming dissatisfaction
with general search warrants, 126 it is clear that the sanctity of the home
has been of utmost importance to Americans: "[P]hysical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed." 127 Arguably more so than the other categories
of protected property, "[t]he home has a special status as a protected
place, even when the owner is not present." 128 For this reason,

124
The Supreme Court considers these factors (whether an area is the
site of intimate
association and whether an individual has an expectation of privacy in a place) when conducting

Fourth Amendment analyses. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) ("We
identified the central component of [the curtilage] inquiry as whether the area harbors the
'intimate activity associated with the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.""')
(quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (internal citation omitted)).
12
See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (The home is
"ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection[.]"); Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of
a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental

intrusion[.]"); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) ("It is not the breaking of his doors,
and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property[.]").
116 See supra Part IIA; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601
(1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring).

United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
CLANCY, supra note 19, at 6 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Alderman
v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969)); see also Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (A warrantless search of a
man's home "is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty[,] and
127

128
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warrantless
searches inside of the home are presumptively
129
unreasonable.
Drawing from the history behind the Fourth Amendment's
adoption, Professor David Steinberg writes that the Framers intended
the Fourth Amendment to "proscribe only a single, discrete activityphysical searches of houses pursuant to a general warrant, or no
warrant at all." 130 This is because in the years leading up to the
Amendment's adoption, the colonists were primarily concerned with
unlawful searches of the home. 13 1 This concern has not faded. Modern
search and seizure jurisprudence often refers to the sanctity of the
home: 132 "[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first
among equals. At the Amendment's 'very core' stands 'the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
1 33
governmental intrusion."'
Searches related to the home are given the highest level of
protection, 134 requiring a warrant pursuant to a showing of probable
cause, even in extreme circumstances. For example, the warrantless
search of a house was held unconstitutional even after it had been
ravaged by fire.1 35 Non-physically-invasive searches, like the use of a
likewise
are
porch,
individual's
on
an
dog
drug-sniffing
36
unconstitutional.1
Courts' analyses do not always hinge on the occupant's expectation
of privacy (the Katz test). Katz opened the door for lower courts to find
a search unconstitutional for privacy-related reasons, 13 7 but traditional

private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public
offense[.]").
129 See Payton, 445 U.S. at
586.
Steinberg, supra note 24, at 1053.
See id. at 1063.
See, e.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 601 (Powell J., concurring) ("[N]either history nor this
Nation's experience requires us to disregard the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home
that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic").
133 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
'
See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 316 (1971) ("And over the years the Court
consistently has been most protective of the privacy of the dwelling." (citing Vale v. Louisiana, 399
U.S. 30 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-630 (1886))).
in
United States v. Parr, 716 F.2d 796, 810 (11th Cir. 1983).
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417-18.
13
See, e.g., Stephanie M. Stern, Article, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the
17
Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 939 (2010) (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S.
796, 810 (1984)); see also Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the "ReasonableExpectation of Privacy"' An
Emerging TripartiteAnalysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1111-12 (1987) ("Before Katz, the home was
protected simply because it was the home.... After Katz, the home is a protected locale, not only
by virtue of its explicit mention in the language of the [F]ourth [A]mendment, but also (and
perhaps primarily) because of the human activities innately associated with it.").
1w
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notions of property law remain. 138 The home is still considered a
constitutionally protected sphere in its own right. 139 Under both the
privacy- and property-based analyses, courts often refer to the
underlying values of the Fourth Amendment, like privacy and dignity,
when discussing the heightened protection afforded dwellings. Further,
the interior of one's home deserves the highest level of Fourth
Amendment protection. 140
B.

Makeshift Shelters Are Houses for Fourth Amendment Purposes

Given the Fourth Amendment's original purpose was to safeguard
the home from unreasonable searches, 14 1 if nothing else, individuals
should be free from government intrusion inside their homes. Although
they are nontraditional houses, the makeshift shelters of the homeless
function as their houses, and should be treated as such. This means a
search warrant is required prior to law enforcement's entry. This
section will contain three major arguments to support this contention.
Again, these are: (1) houses are places of intimate association and
privacy, (2) the Fourth Amendment protects nontraditional houses, and
(3) the Amendment's normative values support including even
temporary shelters within the definition of "houses."
1. Fourth Amendment houses are places where intimate activities
associated with domestic life occur.
The Supreme Court has never provided a formal definition for
"houses" in the context of the Fourth Amendment. One author suggests
that Katz implies that houses for Fourth Amendment purposes are
areas where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacywhere she is "excluded from public scrutiny." 142 Because "Fourth

"
13

See, e.g., Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1419 (Kagan, J., concurring).
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012) ("[W]e [do not] believe that

Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment protects persons and their private conversations,

was intended to withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment extends to the home."
(quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 180 (1969))).
40 See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986) (citation
omitted)
(An individual "plainly has a reasonable, legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy within
the interior of . .. covered buildings, and it is equally clear that expectation is one society is
prepared to observe."); Stern, supra note 137, at 950-51 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment too
stringently protects the home and its curtilage, but conceding that heightened Fourth Amendment
protection is appropriate for the interior rooms of the home, because of their relation to
substantive privacy rights and intimate association).
141
See Steinberg, supra note 24, at 1053.
"' Granston, supra note 120, at 1308.
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Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation,"143
however, "houses" cannot be limited to those spaces where an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. But, privacy should
be considered in defining a house for Fourth Amendment purposes. In
addition, two areas we may look at to inform our definition of "houses"
are federal statutes that define a "dwelling," and the Supreme Court's
definition of curtilage.
a. Defining a "house"or"dwelling"
Samuel Johnson's "A Dictionary of the English Language,"
published in 1792, defines "house," in relevant part, as "a place wherein
a man lives; a place of human abode." 144 Webster's Dictionary defines a
"house" as "a building that serves as living quarters for one or a few
families." 145 These definitions are not especially helpful, but at the
same time do not bar the inclusion of a homeless person's makeshift
shelter.
"House" and "dwelling" are closely related. Courts often use the
terms interchangeably, and the definition of one can be used to inform
that of the other. Black's Law Dictionary defines "dwelling" as a "house
or other structure in which a person or persons live" or a "[s]tructure
used as place of habitation." 14 6 According to the Ninth Circuit: "The
common legal meaning of dwelling, as reflected in numerous sources,
includes at least two elements: that it be a structure, and that it be
used as a residence."147 The court cited a number of federal statutes in
support of this definition. For example, the Fair Housing Act states:
"'Dwelling' means any building, structure, or portion thereof which is
occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by
one or more families[.]" 14 8 The Code of Federal Regulations relating to
Native American veterans defines "dwelling" as "a building designed
primarily for use as a home, consisting of one residential unit only and
not containing any business unit." 149 The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
states: "Dwelling means a residential structure that contains one to
four units, whether or not that structure is attached to real property.

143

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).

144

SAMUEL

JOHNSON,

DICTIONARY

OF

THE

ENGLISH

LANGUAGE

444

(10th

ed.

1792),

https: /play.google.com/books/reader?id-j-UIAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader
&hl=en&pg-GBS.PT3 [https: //perma.cc /QW9X-Q9PV].
1'

Merriam-Webster, House, DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/house

[http://perma.cc/9MHF-QVPL] (last visited Jan. 3, 2016).
1

148
149

BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).

United States v. Romer-Bustamente, 337 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003).
42 U.S.C. § 3602(b).
38 C.F.R. § 36.4501.
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The term includes, but is not limited to, an individual condominium or
cooperative unit and a mobile or other manufactured home."so
None of these definitions require specific physical features in order
to qualify as a dwelling. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act does not
even require the structure be "attached to real property." Congress
seems to have found it sufficient that for a place to qualify as a
dwelling, it serve as a residence for at least one family. A homeless
person's makeshift shelter meets this definition, as it is the place she
lives. But, of course, not every place a person decides to live qualifies as
a house for Fourth Amendment purposes. In determining what does
qualify as a house, and therefore which makeshift shelters should be
treated equivalently to houses, it is helpful to look at how courts have
defined "curtilage."
b. Defining "curtilage"
Curtilage is the space "harbor[ing] those intimate activities
associated with domestic life and the privacies of the home."" 1 "At
common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate
activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home . . . 'and therefore
has been considered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment
purposes." 152 Curtilage has been held to include crawl spaces beneath a
house, 15 3 an enclosed backyard, 154 and a front porch,15 5 among other
areas.
In United States v. Dunn,156 the Court presented four factors to
consider in determining what qualifies as curtilage: (1) "the proximity
of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home," (2) "whether the area
is included within an enclosure surrounding the home," (3) "the nature
of the uses to which the area is put, and" (4) "the steps taken by the
resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by."157
These factors are not dispositive in resolving all curtilage questions,
but "are useful analytical tools" to determine "whether the area in

12 C.F.R. § 202.13(a)(2) (emphasis added).
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 n.4 (1987).
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886)).
153 See United States v. Pacheco-Ruiz, 549 F.2d 1204,
1207 (9th Cir. 1976).
154
See United States v. Romero-Bustamente, 337 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.
2003).
105 See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct.
1409, 1414-15 (2013).
15 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
15

117

Id. at 301.
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question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed
under the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection." 15 8
In sum, curtilage is a zone in which intimate activities occur, and
the resident has taken steps to enclose the space and protect it from the
observation of others. Spaces meeting these requirements and in close
proximity to the home are considered part of the "dwelling" for Fourth
Amendment purposes. 159 The same rationale courts use to determine
that a space qualifies as curtilage could be used to define a makeshift
shelter deserving of similar protection. A "makeshift shelter" protected
by the Fourth Amendment would thus be a place in which: (1) a person
lives, (2) that she has taken steps to protect from observation, (3) that
she has taken measures to enclose, and (4) in which intimate activities
routine to the home occur. As a starting point, courts could look to
these factors to determine whether a particular structure qualifies as a
"makeshift shelter" for Fourth Amendment purposes. 160
c. The intimate activities approach
Lastly, a bit more can be said about the "nature of the uses to
which the area is put" prong of the curtilage test. In regard to this
prong, the Court has expressed concern over protecting areas where
"intimate activities associated with domestic life and the privacies of
the home" occur. 161 These concerns are especially salient when it comes
to the makeshift shelters of the homeless. Professor Stephanie Stern
argues that areas where private activities and intimate association
take place should be the focus of Fourth Amendment analysis related to
houses. 162 She suggests that searches in the home that threaten the
inhabitants' intimate association should be given the utmost protection,
while those that are less intrusive, for example, collecting data on the
heat inside of a house, should be given less. 163 This suggestion is in line
with evidence that the Fourth Amendment uses the home as a proxy for
protecting the intimate activities that so often occur there. 164
158

Id.

See Romero-Bustamente, 337 F.3d at 1110.
As an aside, there would be no concern that a homeless person living on a public sidewalk
could claim the sidewalk as curtilage. Just as a person residing in a house in the middle of an open
field cannot claim the surrounding land is part of her dwelling, a homeless person who has not
taken measures to enclose the surrounding area, conduct intimate activities there, and shield the
space from observers could not claim the space was curtilage. Cf. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 179 (1984) ("[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the
Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance.").
161
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 n.4 (1987).
"9

'60

12

See Stern, supra note 137, at 920.
See id. at 943-45.

164

See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984) ("But the home is sacred in
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The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches should unquestionably apply to the inside of a homeless
person's shelter. For poorer individuals who do not have the luxury of a
multi-room house, the one room they have, or the space inside their
tent, is the bedroom, the family room, and the kitchen. The space is
arguably more tied to its inhabitants' intimate activities than are the
houses of wealthier individuals, because it is virtually the only place
these individuals have to conduct such exercises. While someone living
in a three-bedroom house may not have her private conversations in
the home's entryway, the likelihood that a family living in a one-room
house would do so is much higher. Individuals with lower socioeconomic
statuses spend more time in public than the wealthy, and have fewer
private spaces to engage in intimate association. 165 Wealthier
individuals, by virtue of their socioeconomic status, are more likely to
own cars, rent hotel rooms, and be able to afford the luxury that
privacy has come to be. 1 6 6 A homeless individual's one-room shelter
may be the only place intimate activities can take place, 167 which cuts
in favor of providing the homeless with heightened protection against
warrantless searches of their dwellings, or in the very least, protection
equal to that which wealthier individuals receive.
Gregory Townsend similarly argues courts should "focus more on
the nature of the activity conducted at the place which police search,
not the mere location" when conducting Fourth Amendment
analyses. 168 Townsend argues courts should apply the Supreme Court
of Hawaii's "government acquiescence" doctrine from State v. Dias,169
holding that a homeless person's expectation of privacy is reasonable
when the government has acquiesced to her residing on public land. 170
This Comment takes Townsend's argument a step further, arguing the
homeless have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their temporary
Fourth Amendment terms not primarily because of the occupants' possessory interests in the

premises, but because of their privacy interests in the activities that take place within.").
6
See, e.g., Stern, supra note 137, at 923.
16

See William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.

REV. 1265, 1272 (1998-99) ("[I1f [the] goal [of police searches] is to protect against the harm of
being observed, it will give most of its protection to people who can afford lives that allow limited
observation. That excludes the urban poor.").
1

A current circuit split exists in which five circuit courts have held tenants do not have a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of their buildings, further limiting the
number of areas in which the poor can expect privacy. See Orin Kerr, Use of a Drug-sniffing Dog at
an Apartment Door Is a 'Search,' 7th Circuit Holds, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2016),
https: //www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/04/13/use-of-a-drug-sniffing-dog

-at-an-apartment-door-is-a-search-7th-circuit-holds/
Townsend, supra note 120, at 239.
169
609 P.2d 637 (Haw. 1980).
1o

Id. at 225.

[https://perma.cc/F2AK-ZMU8].
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shelters on public or private land, and with or without government
acquiescence. Law enforcement's position toward the homeless should
not alter the Fourth Amendment's application to searches of their
dwellings. Rather, if their dwellings resemble areas that are already
considered houses for Fourth Amendment purposes-those meeting the
abovementioned curtilage factors-they should always be protected
against warrantless searches.
2. "Houses" include nontraditional houses, both lavish
and impoverished.
Houses are protected under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of
their appearance, value, or location.1 7 1 The Katz privacy-based test did
not eliminate the Fourth Amendment's protection of certain spheres of
physical property-"constitutionally protected areas." 1 72 History
instructs us that the house and its curtilage have always been two of
these areas. The Court has not hesitated to strike down a number of
non-physically invasive searches because they took place in the
protected sphere of the home. If a dog-sniff on the porch 73 and the use
of a thermal imaging device outside of the house 174 are unconstitutional
searches, surely physically entering a homeless person's dwelling is
prohibited. Exceptions to the warrant requirement exist when exigent
circumstances are present.17 5 Poverty, however, is not an exception.17 6
To the contrary, multiple courts have held the Fourth Amendment's
protection applies to all houses, independent of their appearance or
apparent value.1 77
17'

But cf. David Reichbach,

17

Poverty is not meant to be an exception to the warrant requirement. William Stuntz

Comment, The Home Not the Homeless: What the Fourth
Amendment Has HistoricallyProtected and Where the Law is Going After Jones, 47 U.S.F. L. REV.
377 (2012) (arguing the Katz test unintentionally favors the wealthy and those who can afford to
purchase security features for their homes, and disadvantages the homeless and the urban poor).
172
See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
171
See id.
174
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 30-41 (2001).
176
See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment has
drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may
not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.").
explains however, that in practice the Fourth Amendment disproportionately favors the wealthy to
the detriment of the urban poor. It favors those who can afford greater privacy protections, and
who perform more activities out of the eye of the public. See Stuntz, supra note 166.
1
See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) ("[A] constitutional distinction
between 'worthy' and 'unworthy' containers would be improper[.]"); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d
1318, 1326 n.11 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment does not permit [the government] to
differentiate on a per se basis in the privacy accorded different stocks of housing."); United States
v. Vurgess, No. CR408-085, 2008 WL 4389830, at *8 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2008) ("But the simple fact
that some homes are better constructed or maintained than others . . . in no way diminishes the
sanctity of the dwelling or affords an officer any greater right to thrust himself across the
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For example, in United States v. Vurgess, 178 the District Court for
the Southern District of Georgia held that police conducted an
unconstitutional search when they entered the defendant's home
without a warrant or probable cause. The court held the Fourth
Amendment's protection against warrantless searches applies equally
to mansions and shacks:
A home built as a fortress and surrounded by a security
perimeter patrolled by guards is obviously more secure, and in a
sense more 'private,' than is a thin-walled shack located along a
public thoroughfare. But as to neither property can a law
enforcement officer conduct a warrantless search without the
resident's consent or some exigency requiring urgent action. 179
1 8 0 the
In United States v. Barajas-Avalos,
Ninth Circuit held
officers had not violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
when they peered through the window of his travel trailer from an open
fieldI81 or when they searched the surrounding area. 182 The court,
however, distinguished this search from a hypothetical search of the
interior of a home, emphasizing, "[T]here is no Fourth Amendment rule
that provides for protection only for traditionally constructed
houses." 18 3 Because there was no evidence the trailer was being used as
either a permanent or temporary home, the surrounding area did not
qualify as curtilage. 18 4 Had the trailer been used as the defendant's
home, and had the search been of its interior, it likely would have been
held unconstitutional. The court stated, "a person has a right to privacy
in his dwelling house, or temporary sleeping quarters, whether in a
hotel room, a trailer, or in a tent in a public area, or on government
land not open to the public for overnight camping." 18

threshold of the home."); State v. Pruss, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (Idaho 2008) ("The respect for the
sanctity of the home does not depend upon whether it is a mansion or hut, or whether it is a
permanent or a temporary structure."); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3(b) (4th ed.
2015) ("Fourth Amendment protection ...
[against a warrantless search] extends even to

'occupants of flimsily constructed dwellings with unobstructed windows or other openings directly
on public lands, streets, or sidewalks, who failed to lock their doors to bar entrance."' (citing
United States v. Moss, 963 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1992))).
17 No. CR408-085, 2008 WL 4389830 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2008).
179
Id. at *8.
377 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2004).
18
8
1

a
1

Id. at 1055-56.
Id. at 1057-58.

Id. at 1055-56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1057-58.
Id. at 1055.
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California v. Carney8 6 also dealt with the search of a motor home.
As in Barajas-Avalos, the Supreme Court in Carney held the trailer
was not being used as the defendant's home, and thus was not a house
in the Fourth Amendment context.18 7 The automobile exception to the
warrant requirement applied to the motor home, because it was being
used as an automobile.18 8 In addition, society expects a lesser degree of
privacy in automobiles, because they are subject to constant
regulation, 189 and can be driven miles away before the police can secure
a warrant. 190
The holding in Carney does not implicate the definition of a house
under the Fourth Amendment, or exclude the shelters of the homeless
from that definition. To avoid interpreting the case as importing a
naked class-based distinction into the Fourth Amendment's protection
of houses, it must be read as a case about vehicles and not houses.
While the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence may reflect a
"[r]omantic characterization of the home as a refuge from the
corruption and danger of urban life,"191 the Fourth Amendment
192
forecloses blatant distinctions between worthy and unworthy houses.
If Carney were read as a case about houses, it would establish a rule
affording less Fourth Amendment protection to houses of lower
socioeconomic statuses.
Clarifying that homeless individuals' shacks, tents, and other
shelters are included within Fourth Amendment "houses" would
provide owners of other nontraditional houses with greater protection
as well. Houses that are built into nature, 193 for example, or houses
that are especially small or plain looking, 194 would benefit from a rule

la

471 U.S. 386 (1985).
Id. at 393-94.
Id. at 393; see generally Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925) (explaining
'n
the automobile exception: officers may search a vehicle without obtaining a warrant if there is
probable cause to believe the vehicle is transporting contraband).
1a9 Carney, 471 U.S. at 392.
`7

'0

Id. at 390-91.

Stern, supra note 137, at 919.
See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483, 490 (1964) (citations omitted) ("No less than a tenant of a house ... a guest in a hotel room is
entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.").
113 See, e.g., Sarah Park, 23 Houses Built into Nature, MATADOR NETWORK (Apr. 17, 2013),
[http://perma.cc/7SYF-NHU8]
http: //matadornetwork.com/life/23-houses-built-into-nature-pics/
(photos of houses built into nature around the world); Caitlin Schmidt,8 Weird Houses Worth a
Visit, CNN (June 23, 2015, 11:53 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/11/travellweird-houses/
[http://perma.cc/3DGK-RHDY] (photos of eight unconventional houses in the United States).
'" See, e.g., 10 Extreme Tiny Homes, HGTV, http://www.hgtv.com/remodellinteriorremodel/10-extreme-tiny-homes-pictures [http:I/perma.cc/RD5B-VTKJ] (last visited Jan. 14, 2016)
(documenting ten "extreme tiny homes" that people live in, some of which may not appear to be
'91

192

traditional houses from the outside).
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requiring officers to obtain a warrant before searching any structure
resembling a person's home. These houses may be more susceptible to
warrantless entries than traditional-looking houses, because law
enforcement might assume they are uninhabited.
On the other hand, police officers would likely assume that a
structure built into the side of a mountain, visibly equipped with
features like electricity and security cameras, was a house and could
not be entered without a warrant. Why then should the presumption be
any different when the dwelling appears more impoverished, but is still
a house nonetheless? To protect all residents of nontraditional homes,
rich or poor, homeless or not, a warrant should be required prior to law
enforcement's search.
3. Normative values of dignity and privacy provide for a broad
interpretation of "houses."
Cases that have affirmed that warrantless searches of homeless
individuals' temporary shelters are unconstitutional searches should be
followed. These courts have recognized that a house is a house, and the
poorest home is entitled to the same protection as the wealthiest. 195
Again, few courts have tackled the issue of a homeless person's Fourth
Amendment rights in her temporary shelter. Slightly more have
addressed the rights of the homeless in their personal possessions.
In Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 196 the police seized and disposed of
the personal possessions, including temporary shelters, of a group of
homeless individuals living on Skid Row. 197 The Lavan court's analysis
focused on the individuals' possessory rights to the property, because
the relevant question was of a seizure not a search. The court perfectly
explained in dicta, however, why the individuals were also likely
protected against a warrantless search of their possessions, including
their houses, based on their reasonable expectations of privacy. 198 The
Ninth Circuit first quoted Silverman v. United States1 99 : "A man can
still control a small part of his environment, his house . . . . A sane,
decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis, some shelter

See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (citation omitted) ("Fourth
Amendment protection ... extends even to 'occupants of flimsily constructed dwellings with
unobstructed windows or other openings directly on public lands, streets, or sidewalks, who failed
to lock their doors to bar entrance."').
% 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2855 (2013).
1
Id. at 1025.
195

Id. at 1028 n.6.

"

365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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200
from public scrutiny . . . some inviolate place which is a man's castle."
The court then concluded,

As our sane, decent, civilized society has failed to afford more of
an oasis, shelter, or castle for the homeless of Skid Row than
their [mobile shelters], it is in keeping with the Fourth
Amendment's 'very core' for the same society to recognize as
reasonable homeless persons' expectation that their [mobile
shelters] are not beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment. 20 1
The court's reasoning draws on the Fourth Amendment's
underlying values of protecting one's dignity and privacy, as well as the
second-prong of the Katz reasonableness test. The court's dicta also
suggest a potential necessity defense for the homeless: Society has
failed to provide adequate housing and job opportunities for the
homeless, and so with literally no other safe place to live, they are
202
forced to reside on public property.
Cases related specifically to the temporary shelters of the homeless
have largely cropped up in state courts. The Supreme Court of Idaho's
opinion in State v. PruSS2 03 is instructive on the way in which courts can
interpret the Fourth Amendment to protect the rights of the homeless.
Despite the defendant's nontraditional shelter and presence on public
land, the court focused on the underlying values of the Fourth
Amendment and its equal application to all structures. 204 The
defendant was suspected of burglarizing local homes. 205 He resided in a
"hooch"-a structure created with tree limbs and tarp-in the forest,
and was arrested after exiting his hooch. 206 The court held the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hooch, despite
its presence on public land.207
The Pruss court's conclusion was based on a number of factors. The
court did not go so far as to refer to the hooch as the defendant's home,
but held the Fourth Amendment does not discriminate against different
types of structures: "If the travel trailer is protected against
government intrusion, then so is the tent." 208

200

Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1028 n.6 (quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511 n.4).

201

id.

Cf. U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supranote 95, at 6 (explaining the lack
of affordable public housing is one of the reasons many people are forced to live in public places).
203 181 P.3d 1231 (Idaho 2008).
202

24

Id. at 1234-35.

205

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

206
207
208

at
at
at
at

1232.
1233.
1236.
1235.
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In Dias, the Supreme Court of Hawaii also held police officers'
warrantless search of a homeless person's temporary shelter was
unconstitutional. 20 9 There, police officers peered through an open flap of
a homeless person's makeshift shelter, and observed what they believed
to be illegal gambling activity. 210 The plain view doctrine allowed
officers to look through the opening, but did not allow them to enter the
shelter without a warrant. 211 The shelter was situated among other
homeless shelters, and the government had not previously instructed
the defendants to move. The court held "although no tenancy under
property concepts was thereby created .

.

. this long acquiescence by the

government has given rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy on the
part of the defendants, at least with respect to the interior of the
building itself." 212
In addition to the government's acquiescence, the court considered,
"traditional notions of fair play and justice" in finding that the
defendants' expectation of privacy was reasonable. 213 As in Pruss, the
Dias court's analysis could have been simplified by the presumption
that structures closely resembling a home are entitled to the highest
level of protection under the Fourth Amendment. The court ultimately
comes to this conclusion, relying on both the Fourth Amendment's
underlying values and the individuals' reasonable expectations of
privacy.
While opinions like Pruss and Dias are not perfect, they are a step
in the right direction and should serve as guidance for other courts
addressing similar issues. Going forward, courts should have no trouble
finding that the temporary shelters of the homeless do in fact qualify as
"houses" under the Fourth Amendment. The meaningful similarities
between a homeless person's shelter and a traditional house push in
favor of including these dwellings within the purview of Fourth
Amendment "houses."
The Framers could not have predicted the types of searches that
occur today. 2 14 New technology, like drones, thermal imaging devices,
and GPS monitoring have forced the Court to apply the Fourth
Amendment in ways never before imagined. An unreasonable search

209

State v. Dias, 609 P.2d 637 (Haw. 1980).

210
211

Id. at 640.
Id.
id.

212
213

Id.

Cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494-95 (2014) (The fact that cellphones were not
around at the time of the Founding does not make them "any less worthy of the protection for
which the Founders fought.").
214
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includes using a GPS device to monitor an individual's movements, 2 15
and using a plane to survey his backyard. 2 16 An unreasonable search of
one's house includes using thermal imaging to detect the temperature
inside, 217 or a dog to identify the smells radiating from within. 218
Similarly, society has evolved in terms of the importance we give to
concepts like human rights, and it is gradually evolving in terms of the
way we think about the problem of homelessness. 219
Research and technology should, and do, shape the way the
Constitution is applied. 220 For example, just last year, the Court
declared that under the Fourteenth Amendment, same-sex couples
have a place within the doctrine of marriage. 22 1 The Court was explicit:
There is not a right to same-sex marriage; there is a right to marriage,
to which same-sex couples are entitled. 222 A similar rationale can be
used to include the shelters of the homeless in the Fourth Amendment's
category of "houses." There is no need for a new class of property
protection. The Fourth Amendment has always protected houses, and
to the utmost degree, and it is time that the makeshift shelters of the
homeless are included within the meaning of "houses."
Changes in the way we think about homelessness, including the
role society plays in failing to provide an adequate amount of affordable
housing, should shape the way we think about the temporary shelters
of the homeless. Because these individuals have literally no place else
to live-due in part to society's failure-is it right to demean them by
excluding them from the privacy and dignity the Fourth Amendment
provides?

See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-53 (2012).
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 210 (1986).
217
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35-40 (2001) (holding the warrantless use of a
thermal imaging device to detect temperature inside the home violated the Fourth Amendment).
218
See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414-15 (2013) (holding use of drug-sniff dog on
defendant's porch to detect marijuana was an unconstitutional search).
215

216

See,

e.g.,

NAT'L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, CRIMINALIZATION OF
HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE U.N. COMMITTEE AGAINST
219

TORTURE (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/ushrnetwork.org/files/04-indivnlchp.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW26-CDBQ] (the criminalization of homelessness in America is a
violation of the International Convention Against Torture).
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466-68 (2012), as an example of an instance in
220
which the Court relied on new research and societal understandings to disrupt the status quo. In
Miller, the Court held that society now has a better understanding of how children develop,
rendering mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles unconstitutional.
22
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
222
Id. at 2602.
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V. CHANGING POLICE TACTICS TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF
THE HOMELESS

This Part will discuss a few of the policy implications of recognizing
that the homeless are entitled to broader Fourth Amendment
protection. First, it will anticipate a change in the way law enforcement
treats the homeless, with a shift toward a more dignity-centric
approach. Next, it will explain why providing the homeless with greater
protection against unlawful searches will not detract from their
protection against private acts of violence.
If courts were to recognize that a warrantless search of a homeless
person's makeshift shelter is unconstitutional, police tactics would have
to change. Any evidence seized in the course of a warrantless search
would be subject to exclusion, 223 and officers who conducted the search
with knowledge of its unconstitutionality could be subject to suit. These
changes could contribute to a nationwide discussion about the way in
which we police the homeless. 224 A more dignity-centric method of
policing the homeless should result in fewer violent confrontations
between the homeless and law enforcement, without hindering law
enforcements' incentives to protect the homeless from private attacks.
A.

Improving Police Interactions with the Homeless through DignityCentric Policies

If lower courts were to strike down warrantless searches of
homeless individuals' makeshift shelters as unconstitutional, law
enforcement would have to take notice. To generate awareness of the
shift, housing and homeless rights attorneys could bring litigation
challenging the now prohibited searches. They could also ensure
homeless individuals were informed of their right to be free from
government intrusion into their shelters, and to deny officers entry
without a warrant. On the side of law enforcement, police tactics would
have to change. Trainings and formal policy revisions would be
necessary to educate officers on how to approach the homeless. These
m
As long as officers are aware that a warrant is required before searching a homeless
person's shelter, the exclusionary rule would likely apply. "To trigger the exclusionary rule, police

conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently
culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. ... [he exclusionary
rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances
recurring or systemic negligence." Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
224 In 2012 the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness issued a report stating revised
trainings and policies for the police are necessary to improve homelessness in America. Cities in a
number of states, including Minnesota, Colorado, Florida, and Oregon have already created
programs that educate police officers on how to interact with the homeless. See U.S. INTERAGENCY
COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 95, at 25.
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policies should be dignity-centric, and include information on why
officers must obtain a warrant before searching a homeless person's
residence. 225 In this way, the warrant requirement is the first step in
developing a more dignity-focused method of policing.
Applying the warrant requirement to the shelters of the homeless
would not impede police officers' investigative abilities. Officers can
still enter a homeless person's makeshift shelter, just as they can any
house, after obtaining a warrant. 226 As Justice Jackson expressed in
Johnson v. United States,227 the Fourth Amendment does not "den[y]
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence." But rather, "require[s] that those inferences
be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate[.] .. . [A]

search

without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave
the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers." 228
Officers may also enter the shelters of the homeless without a warrant
pursuant to exigent circumstances. These include in pursuit of a fleeing
felon, 229 to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, 230 to assist an
injured person, 231 or in other emergency situations. 232
A new policy regarding the way in which police enter a homeless
person's shelter is not radical. The change would come at a particularly
appropriate time, and fit in smoothly with new policies on the rights of
the homeless that exist in a number of cities. Three states-Illinois,
Connecticut, and Rhode Island-recently enacted legislation to protect
the rights of the homeless.

233

These laws address a homeless person's

right to privacy in his or her property. 234 The laws are somewhat vague
A dignity-centric approach to search policies is in line with the Fourth Amendment's
2
concern for dignity. John Castiglione argues that dignity is as much a founding principle of the
Fourth Amendment as privacy, but has been under-emphasized by most courts. He suggests in
addition to weighing an individual's privacy interest against law enforcement's need for a
particular search, courts should weigh the interest of law enforcement against the individual's
reasonable expectation of dignity. See John D. Castiglione, Article, Human Dignity Under the
FourthAmendment, 2008 Wis. L. REV. 655 (2008).
226
See, e.g., Tony Hernandez, PortlandPolice Locate Stolen Weapons Inside Tent, OREGONIAN
http://www.oregonlive.com/portlandlindex.ssf/2016/01/portlandpolice_1ocate
(Jan. 26, 2016),
stolen.html [https://perma.cc/V3DX-Q5HA] (Police officers searched the tent of two homeless men
after obtaining a warrant and seized stolen weapons. The men were arrested without incident.).
227 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
221 Id. at 13-14.
229 See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976).
See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38-41 (1963).
See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
232
See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504-08 (1978) (Warrantless entry onto private
property was permissible to fight a fire and investigate its cause.).
See Bill of Rights for the Homeless Act, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45 / 10 (2013); An Act
233
Concerning a Homeless Person's Bill of Rights, 2013 Conn. Acts 13-251 (Reg. Sess.); Homeless Bill
of Rights, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37.1-3 (2012).
234
See, e.g., Bill of Rights for the Homeless Act, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45 / 10(a)(7) (2013) ("A
23o
231

769]

THE FORGOTTEN RESIDENTS

805

in terms of the type of property they protect, and leave open the
possibility that makeshift shelters are included. Similar "Right to Rest"
laws are being considered in California; Delaware; Baltimore,
Maryland; Minnesota; 235 Missouri; Oregon; Puerto Rico; Tennessee;
Vermont; and Madison, Wisconsin. 236 In addition, in December 2015,
Massachusetts unanimously recommended a homeless bill of rights
that would prohibit discrimination based on housing status. 23 7
This type of protective legislation is needed to counteract
legislation criminalizing homelessness. 238 In the past two years, the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), and other government agencies have
criticized local laws that criminalize "acts of living." 239 In 2015 HUD
changed its funding application guidelines to disadvantage cities that
had not taken direct measures to combat the criminalization of
homelessness. 240 Recognizing homeless individuals have a Fourth
Amendment interest in their shelters, equivalent to that of other
homeowners, is in line with DOJ and HUD's approaches. 24 1 Police

person experiencing homelessness has . .. the right to a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or
her personal property to the same extent as personal property in a permanent residence.").
23 Minneapolis passed a homeless bill of rights in March 2015, but the bill is not yet law. The
law would provide, among other things, homeless encampments be given fifteen days' notice before

they are disbanded. See Bryce Covert, City Passes Innovative 'Homeless Bill of Rights', THINK
PROGRESS (Mar. 5, 2015, 10:15 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2015/03/05/3630141/
indianapolis-homeless-bill-of-rights/ [http://perma.cc/2FJY-EERB].
2

See Nat'l Coal. for the Homeless, Homeless Bill of Rights, BLDG. A MOVEMENT TO END
(2014),
http: /nationalhomeless.org/campaigns/bill-of-right/
[http://perma.cc/

HOMELESSNESS

TNY8-LNZU].
237

See Katie Lannan, Legislative Committee Approves Homeless Bill of Rights, EAGLE-

TRIBUNE (Dec. 15, 2015, 3:33 PM), http://www.eagletribune.com/news/legislative-committeeapproves-homeless-bill-of-rights/article b266d62b-4bbf-5541-8dde-f82bc4e6e5d6.html
[http://perma.cc/JJ96-LY9W].
238

See cf. U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 95, at 7 (arguing

criminalization of homelessness is ineffective and does nothing to solve the underlying problem of
homelessness, and can often make matters worse).
'

For example, on its website, HUD states, "Although individuals experiencing homelessness

should be afforded the same dignity, compassion, and support provided to others, criminalization
policies further marginalize men and women who are experiencing homelessness, fuel
inflammatory attitudes, and may even unduly restrict constitutionally protected liberties and

violate our international human rights obligations." U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.,
Alternatives to Criminalizing Homelessness, HOMELESSNESS ASSISTANCE
MAIN
(2014),
https://www.hudexchange.info/homelessness-assistance/alternatives-to-criminalizinghomelessness/ [http://perma.cc/7X9L-QRG3].
240 Two Federal Agencies Weigh in Against Criminalizing Homelessness,
STREET SPIRIT (Oct.

12,

2015),

http: Iwww.thestreetspirit.org/two-federal-agencies-weigh-in-against-criminalizing-

homelessness/ [http://perma.cc/AY53-XYAR].
241
The U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness specifically mentions the Fourth
Amendment as a way for the homeless to challenge criminalization policies that allow

unreasonable searches and seizures
HOMELESSNESS, supra note 95, at 8.

of their property.

See U.S.

INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON
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tactics that treat the homeless with respect would also support the
overhaul of policies that view the homeless as second-class citizens.
One of the general principles behind the warrant requirement is
that it takes some of the discretion involved in a search out of the
hands of the police. 242 This requirement would prevent some of the
most unreasonable searches of a homeless person's shelter from taking
place-those in which a warrant is denied. These searches might have
otherwise occurred for a number of reasons, including a mistaken
suspicion or bias. Because these searches would have been
unreasonable had they occurred, they likely would have provoked a
more violent reaction on the part of the homeless person than would a
legitimate search. In eliminating this category of searches, the warrant
requirement would reduce the number of unnecessary and potentially
violent encounters between the homeless and police.
Further, the warrant requirement often comes with a mandate
that officers knock and announce their presence before entering a
dwelling. 243 Announcement has a number of similar benefits. It is likely
to decrease the potential for violence, enhance the resident's privacy
protection, and help to prevent the destruction of property. 244
Announcement helps prevent violent reactions on the part of the
resident, as well as responses by the officers. 245 In addition, history
suggests that one of the concerns leading to the announcement rule was
the fear that the home would be destroyed. 246 This fear is especially
applicable to the homeless, because their homes are often flimsy and
poorly built. 247 Requiring officers obtain a warrant and take all related
measures before conducting a search should lead to a decline in the
number of potentially violent and destructive encounters between the
homeless and the police.

See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
See Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139 (1970).
244
See id. at 140-42.
245
See, e.g., id. at 140; Mendez v. County of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016)
("[A]n announcement that police were entering the shack would almost certainly have ensured
that Mendez was not holding his BB gun when the officers opened the door. Had this procedure
been followed, the Mendezes would not have been shot.").
246
See Announcement in Police Entries, supra note 243, at 142.
247
Cf. Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth
Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 905-06 (2002) (citing Kemal Alexander
Mericli, The Apprehension of Peril Exception to the Knock and Announce Rule-Part I, 16 SEARCH
AND SEIZURE L. REPORT 129, 132 (July 1989) (arguing that "The English judges who created ...
the knock and announce rule were solely concerned with preventing the needless destruction of a
dwelling-an act with potentially devastating consequences in a preindustrial society.")).
242

243

769]

B.

THE FORGOTTEN RESIDENTS

807

Dignity-Centric Policies Should Prevent a Rise In Private Violence
Against the Homeless

One worry is that more robust Fourth Amendment protections for
the homeless will raise the cost of policing areas in which many
homeless people reside. Assuming a warrant is now required, officers
might want to minimize their chances of accidently conducting an
illegal search, and so avoid areas with heavy homeless populations.
Officers who continue to patrol homeless encampments despite this
new warrant requirement do so at a higher cost than before.
A higher cost of policing could render homeless populations more
susceptible to private acts of violence. Homeless individuals are already
more susceptible to private violence than the average citizen,2 48 and an
additional lack of police protection could have serious consequences for
the group's safety. To prevent such an effect, the trainings and revised
policies discussed above are necessary. Policies that instruct officers not
to enter a homeless person's shelter without a warrant imply the
homeless population is to be treated with a greater sense of respect and
dignity than before. They are to be treated the same way under the law
and by the police as the rest of society. This shift in how officers think
about the homeless, coupled with homeless bills of rights and similar
legislation, should mitigate any inclination police officers might have to
avoid policing homeless encampments.
In addition to educating officers about the new search-related
guidelines, trainings of police officers should incorporate information
about dignity and respect. If police officers were required to monitor
homeless encampments as if they were patrolling wealthy suburban
neighborhoods, there should be no reason that providing the residents
with greater Fourth Amendment protection would hinder the police's
ability to protect them.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recognizing a warrant is required prior to searching a homeless
individual's makeshift shelter is in accordance with the Fourth
Amendment's history and values. Homeless individuals' temporary
shelters are not abandoned property, and their presence on public or
private land does not preclude protection under the Fourth
Amendment. These shelters serve functions identical to those of
traditional houses, and should be treated as such under the
Constitution.

248

See NATL COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 10, at 22.
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Our society is in the midst of a national discussion on policing and
the need to revise law enforcement tactics. The time is ripe for a
widespread conversation on the way we police the homeless. It is easy
to overlook the homeless population because they are a marginalized
group. But, as the data shows, the homeless experience a
disproportionate number of the abusive police practices that much of
society has been pushing to change. As law enforcement agencies across
the country adopt new procedures and training programs for officers,
we need to make sure that policies requiring that police officers treat
the homeless with dignity and respect are included.

